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Estimation  of  Economic  Rent  as  a
Measure  of Factor  Owners' Welfare
Jagjit S.  Brar
Several  studies  have  attempted  to  measure
social  gains  or  losses  of various  sorts of economic
phenomena  by  partial welfare  analysis.  In  such  an
analysis, the concepts  of consumers' and producers'
surpluses  are  the  most  commonly  used  analytical
tools.  Although  the  validity  of each  of these  con-
cepts has  been  debated,  consumers'  surplus  is con-
sidered  more  meaningful  than  producers'  surplus
[Berry,  Mishan].  But  all  of  the  controversy  con-
cerning  validity  and  meaningfulness  of these  con-
cepts has been  on the conceptual level. The empiri-
cal evidence  is lacking.
This  paper  focuses  on  some  of the  theoretical
controversies  that  surround  one  of  these  two
concepts-producers'  surplus  or more  appropriately
economic  rent.'  It  is  argued  that  in  certain
instances  economists have committed fundamental
theoretical  errors in  specifying economic  rent. For
the  first  time,  empirical  evidence  is presented  on
some  of the  controversies  that  surround  this con-
cept.  The  analysis  suggests  that  in  generating  a
valid  welfare  measure  of  factor  owners,  the  em-
pirical  problems  may  be  as  thorny and formidable
as  the  conceptual  problems.  Specifically,  the
objectives  of the  paper are  1) to  present  evidence
that  estimates  of economic  rent  could  be  signifi-
cantly  different  depending  upon  the  nature  of
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In  this paper  the term  economic  rent is  used instead
of the  term  producers'  surplus. The latter  term, as argued
by  Mishan  [ 1968], is misleading.  It is misleading  since the
term  "producer"  carries connotations  of an entrepreneur,
and  consequently  the  producers'  surplus  measure  may
suggest  profits  of  some  sort.  The  term  economic  rent  is
more  appropriate  in  that  it  suggests  returns  to  factor
owners who may or may not be the entrepreneurs.
supply  curve  as  well  as  the  concept  of  rent
employed,  and  2)  to show  that the  use  of statisti-
cally  estimated  supply curves in measuring changes
in  economic  rent  and  welfare  of  factor  owners
could yield inaccurate  estimates.
Theoretical Setting
Theoretical controversy concerning specification
of a valid measure of changes in well-being of factor
owners  has  focused  on  three  basic  issues.  First,
what  supply  curve  is  to  be  employed;  second,
what  concept  of  economic  rent  is  relevant;  and
third,  what conditions  must hold  for the  measure
to  be  valid.  Although  this  paper  will  not address
the  last  issue,  a brief comment  is in  order.  Berry
has  attempted  to  establish  a symmetry  between
producers'  surplus  and  consumers'  surplus.  He has
indicated  that  "there  is  little  reason  to  believe
that  the  set  of  conditions  which  make  the  con-
sumers'  surplus  measure  meaningful  are  better
satisfied  in  the  real  world  than  the  (almost)
symmetrical  set  which  make  the  producers'
surplus  measure  relevant  [pg.  79]."2  He  has
failed  to  note,  however,  that  production  of some
products,  particularly  of agricultural  crops,  is very
risky.  For such  products, specification  and estima-
tion  of supply  curves  would  be more  problematic
than  that  of  demand  curves.  Consequently,  the
estimation  of economic  rent  may  be  less  precise
compared  to  the  measure  of consumers'  surplus
in the case of agricultural  industries.
Economic  theory  suggests  that  two  types  of
supply  curves  and  three  alternative  measures
of  economic  rent  may  be  employed  to  estimate
changes  in  the  factor  owners'  welfare.  Supply
2  One  additional  condition  noted  by  Berry  is that  in
the  case  of producers'  surplus,  each  industry  should  be
producing under constant returns to scale.
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curves  may  be  of  short  run  or  long  run  nature,
whereas  economic  well-being  may  be  measured
as Ricardian,  Paretian, or Marshallian rent.3
Concerning  supply  curves,  Mishan  [1968]
has  suggested  that  the  area  above  the  short  run
industry  supply  curve  has  a  clear meaning  and is
relevant  as a measure of Marshallian rent. However,
he  has  indicated  that  the  area  above  a  rising
long run  supply  curve  carries  no  economic  signifi-
cance.  Shepherd  disagreed  with  Mishan.  He
rightfully  distinguished  between  the  Ricardian
and  the  Paretian  concepts  of  economic  rent  and
maintained  that,  in  deriving  welfare  propositions,
economists  are correct  to view  the  area above  the
long  run  supply  curve  as  a  relevant  measure  of
economic rent in the Paretian  sense.
Despite  the  controversy  over  whether  the
rather  restrictive  conditions  hold  in  the  real world
or  not,  and  what  supply  curve  and  concept  of
economic  rent  to  employ,  one  conclusion  seems
inescapable:  the  'tatistically  estimated  supply
curves  might  yield  biased  measures  of changes  in
economic  rent,  and  hence,  in  economic well-being
of factor  owners.  This may be due to  two reasons.
One,  such  supply  curves  often  have either positive
quantity-intercepts  implying zero marginal costs  of
production at initial output levels  or positive  price-
intercepts  significantly.  different  from  marginal
costs.4 In figure  la, which is similar to  the figure in
Schmitz  and  Seckler,  both  of  the  supply  curves
suggest  that  certain  minimum  level  of  output
can be  produced  at zero,  or even negative, marginal
costs  [see  Appendix].  Since  that is rarely  the case
in  the  real  world,  the  social  gain  specified  by
Schmitz  and  Seckler  as  the  area  IHGF  (resulting
from  shift  in  the  supply  curve  from  S°  to  S1
due  to  a  technological  innovation)  could  be
biased.5
3The  three concepts  of economic rent  may  be defined
as  follows:  Ricardian  rent  is the  excess amount earned by
a  factor  over  the  sum  necessary  to  induce  it  to  do  its
work  [Wessel].  Paretian  rent  is  excess  earnings over  the
amount  necessary  to keep the factor in its present occupa-
tion  [Wessel].  Marshallian  rent  is  a  surplus  above  that
necessary  to  elicit  the  productive  services  of  a  resource
specific  or  fixed  in  supply  to  the  industry  in  the  short
run  [Mishan].
Even  if intercept  is "forced"  to equal marginal  costs,
the  slope or  curvature  of the "true"  and estimated  supply
curves may not be identical.
5 Several  other  references  also  could  be  cited  where
social  gains or  losses have been specified and/or estimated
on  the  basis  of similar  supply  curves.  Furthermore,  such
studies  have  rarely  indicated  whether  the  estimates  are
based  on short-  or long-run supply  curves.
Second,  often  production  (supply)  are  not
available  at  very  low and very high prices.  Thus, in
most cases  the  supply  curves  are  estimated  on the
basis  of  mid-range  observations  on  prices  and
quantities  with  the  implicit  assumption  that  a
similar  trend  or  relationship  holds  at  lower  as
well  as  at higher prices.  This assumption,  through
convenient,  is untenable  on the  basis  of economic
reasoning.  Thus,  measurement  of  changes  in
economic  rent  from  supply  curves  estimated
by  extrapolating  the  relationship  that  holds  at
mid-range  prices  and  quantities  would  not  be
accurate.6
The  measurement  problem  of  the  sort  noted
above  could,  however,  be  avoided  by  estimating
welfare  changes  as  changes  in  quasi-rent. 7 For
example,  in  figure  lb, assume  that when  long  run
supply  curve  is S°,  B is  a point  on  AVC  curve.
If due  to  an exogenous increase  in average variable
cost,  the  supply  curve  shifts to S1, E would  be the
-point  on  the  new  AVC  curve.  Assuming  that  the
industry  is  perfectively  competitive  and  points
C and  F  are  also  on  LAC  curve,  change  in  quasi-
rent would equal the  area P° ABC -P'  DEF.
In  light  of  the  above  discussion,  it  would  be
interesting  to  discover  whether  estimates  of
changes  in  economic  rent  and  the  well-being  of
factor  owners based  on  alternative  approaches  are
.equal  to, or  differ from,  one  another.  And if they
differ,  what are the implications of such differences.
These  questions  are  the  subject  of inquiry  of the
following section.
Results
To  investigate  some  of  the  issues  raised  in  the
previous  section,  the  study  focused  on  the case  of
factor  owners  employed  in  the  production  of
annual  rye  grass  seed  in  Oregon.  After  harvest,
6A  parellel question  arises  then  of why would  empiri-
cally  estimated  demand  curves  yield  relatively  more
accurate  estimates  of  consumers'  surplus.  Perhaps  the
consumers'  surplus  measure  would  be  less  precise, too,  in
the  case  of  a  new  product  or  in  cases  where  aggregate
demand  curve  shifts due  to  exogenous changes. But  often
times  consumers'  surplus  is  estimated  for  price  changes
along  a  given  demand  curve;  for  example,  for  a  price
change  similar  to  that  from  P° and  P1  in  figure  la.  And
both  supply  and  demand  curves  can  be  estimated  with
fair  accuracy  in  that range-the  range where  most  of the
data could  be observed.
7 Quasi-rent  as defined  here is measured  as price of rye
grass minus average  variable cost times output.
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Fig.  1  b.  Decrease  in quasi-rent due to an exogenous
increase  in variable  costs of production.
grass  straw  and  residue  are  disposed  of by  open
burning  in  the  fields.  Approximately  one million
tons  of  grass  straw  are  burned  annually  causing
serious  seasonal  air  pollution  problems  in Oregon
[Brar  and  Conklin].  The Oregon  legislature  passed
a bill  stipulating phasing out of burning over a per-
iod  of three  years  starting with  1975.  This would
increase  costs  of  grass  seed  production  [Conklin
and  Bradshaw].  Other  things  equal,  in  the  short
run,  earnings  in  grass  seed  production  would  de-
cline.  In  the  long  run,  some  resources  may leave
the industry and total quantity  of the seed produc-
ed  would  decline.  Assuming that demand does not
change,  seed  price  would  rise.  Consequently,  the
burning  ban  to  control  air  pollution  would  de-
crease rents  to owners of specialized resources.
To  measure  the  effect  on  the  factor  owners'
well-being  by  alternative  approaches,  both  short
run  and  long  run  supply  curves  were  estimated
[Brar].  It  was  assumed  that  costs  of production
would  increase  by  $13  per  acre8 [Conklin  and
Bradshaw],  and  there  would  be  a parallel  upward
shift  in  the  industry  supply  curve.  Under  this
assumption,  new  equilibrium  price  and  output
were  predicted.  By  employing  the  estimated
8Conklin  and  Bradshaw  have  estimated  that  the  cost
increase  due  to  next  best  alternative  residue  removal
technique  would vary  from  $5  to  $10 per acre.  However,
with  recent  inflation,  the  $13  per  acre  cost  increase  is
most realistic.
demand  and  supply  equations,  Paretian,  Mar-
shallian,  and  quasi-rent  were  predicted  under  the
existing  conditions. 9 The  initial  Paretian  rent
was  measured  as  the  area  above  the  long  run
supply  curve  and  below  the  equilibrium  price;
Marshallian  rent  equalled  the  area  between  short
run  supply  and price; and quasi-rent  was estimated
as  specified  in  figure  Ib.  Similarly,  after  the
burning ban  rents  were  estimated  employing  new,
predicted  prices  and  outputs.  Changes  in  factor
owners'  economic  well-being  were  then estimated
as  changes  in  Paretian, Marshallian,  and quasi-rent.
Changes  in  Paretian  and  quasi-rent  also  were
estimated  for supply situations of varying elasticity
to  study  the  relation-ship  between  elasticity  of
supply  and  the  factor  owners'  welfare.' ° The
results  presented  in  table  la  and  lb  suggest  the
following observations:1
9To  measure  quasi-rent,  cost estimates  were obtained
from Conklin and Fisher.
l°Magnitude  of  coefficient  of  elasticity  could  vary
depending  upon  the model specification,  functional form,
nature  of the  data,  and  method  of estimation.  Therefore,
it  was  thought  appropriate  to  determine  the  extent  and
the  sensitivity of changes of various measures  of economic
rent  to changes in elasticity.
One  limitation  of  the  results  needs  mention.  The
supply  equations  employed in  this study were not derived
from  cost curves.  Instead,  short-  and  long- run elasticities
were  estimated  from  a simple  dynamic  model  of supply
relationships  similar to the Nerlove formulation.
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1. Table  1  a reveals that the initial and after burning
ban  estimates  of  Paretian  and  quasi-rent  are  very
significantly  lower  than  the  corresponding  esti-
mates of Marshallian rent.
2.  Both  absolute  and  relative  changes  in  quasi-
rent  are  very  large  compared  to  changes  in  the
other  two  measures  of  rent.  Although  both Mar-
shallian  and  quasi-rent  give  changes  in  well-being
in  the  short  run,  the  large  differences  between
estimates  are  truly  noteworthy. 12 Of  course,
decreases  in  quasi-rent,  among  other  things,
would  depend  upon  relative  share  of variable  and
fixed costs  in total costs of production. Therefore,
these  differences may  not be as  pronounced in the
case  of other industries.
3.  As  the  supply  curve  becomes  more  inelastic,
absolute  decreases  in  Paretian  rent  become  larger,
whereas,  decreases  in  quasi-rent  become  smaller
12 Marshallian  rent  is  a  type  of  quasi-rent,  too.  As
defined  by  Mishan  [1968]  and  measured  here,  it  is the
area  above  short  run  industry  supply  curve  and  below
equilibrium  price.  However,  to  confuse  the  matter,  in
another  reference  he  defines  it  as  excess  receipts  over
the  total of variable  costs  [Mishan,  1973].  But  Ferguson
has  suggested  that  Marshallian  quasi-rent  cannot  be
illustrated  by  means  of  conventional  cost  diagrams.
Thus,  the  quasi-rent  defined  here  and  in  the  textbooks
is not equivalent  to Marshallian  rent.
Table  la. Comparison  among measures  of economic
rent
Estimated  Rent
Measure,  After  Decrease  in  Rent
of Rent  Initial  ban  Absolute  Percent
-----  thousand dollars -----
Paretian  3,251  2,507  744  23
Quasi-rent  2,670  234  2,436  91
Marshallian  7,330  6,645  635  9
(table  lb).  Furthermore,  the decrease  in quasi-rent
under elastic supply situation is very pronounced. 1 3
4.  With  a  decrease  in the  elasticity  of supply, the
relative  change  in Paretian  rent first  increases  and
then  decreases.  On  the  other  hand,  the  relative
change  in  quasi-rent  continues  to  decline.  It
dropped  from  91  percent  to 5 percent  when  elas-
ticity of supply changed  from  1.73 to 0.50.
Conclusions  and Implications
Using  the  same  estimated  supply  and  demand
relationships,  changes  in  rent  and  economic  well-
being of factor  owners  were estimated by different
approaches  suggested  by  economic  theory.  These
changes,  both  absolute  and  relative,  were  found
to  be  significantly  different  depending  upon
1) the  length  of  the  run  of supply  curve;  2)  the
concept  of economic  rent  employed;  and  3)  the
elasticity  of supply.  The  most  striking difference
was  observed  between  two measures  of economic
well-being  in  the  short  run. Changes  in  quasi-rent
were most sensitive to changes in elasticity.
On  the  basis  of  the  evidence  presented  in this
paper,  it  is difficult to conclude  as to which of the
three measures  is "more valid."  But it is very likely
that Marshallian  rent overestimates  the "true" rent.
This  measure  of rent  is estimated  from  short  run
supply  curves.  Such  curves  are  generally  inelastic,
intersect  the  quantity-axis,  and  in  the  real  world
the  existence  of  their  lower  part  is  extremely
13The  estimates  of Paretian  and quasi-rent  in  the case
of elastic  supply  were  based  on  the  actual estimated  long
run  elasticity.  The  other  two  supply  situations  were
hypothesized  for  comparison  purposes  only. The  supply
equations  under  all  situations  were  estimated  such  that
they  passed  through  the  1967-69  average  prices  and
quantities  with  elasticity  equal  to estimated  or  hypothe-
sized coefficient  at that point.
Table  lb.  Comparison  between  changes  in  Paretian  and  quasi-rent  by elasticity of supply (Es)
Paretian  Rent  Quasi-Rent
Estimated  rent  Decreases in  rent  Estimated  rent  Decreases  in  rent
Elasticity  of Supply  Initial  After ban  Absolute  Percent  Initial  After  ban  Absolute  Percent
----  --  thousand dollars ----  -------  thousand dollars --- ---
Elastic  (=1.73)  3,251  2,507  744  23  2,670  234  2,436  91
Unitary  6,296  4,692  1,605  25  2,670  2,435  235  9
Inelastic  (=0.50)  9,651  7,995  1,657  17  2,670  2,529  141  5
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uncertain  for  reasons  discussed  in  the  text  and
the  appendix.  Thus,  inclusion  of the  area  above
the  supply  curve,  part  of  which  may  not exist,
will  obviously inflate  the estimates.
The  paper  suggests  that  the  statistically
estimated  supply  curves  could  provide  biased
estimates.  Furthermore,  evidence  is  provided
suggesting  that  precise  estimates  of  changes  in
the  well-being  of  factor  owners  are  difficult  to
make  even if the restrictive  theoretical  conditions
hold.  Since  such estimates  are often used to calcu-
late  benefit-cost  ratios  of alternative  policies,  the
choice  of an appropriate  policy  could vary depend-
ing upon  the  nature  of the  supply  curve  and the
measure of rent employed.
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Appendix
In  the  text,  it has  been  indicated  that supply
curves  which  intersect  the  quantity  axis  imply
that  certain  minimal  levels  of output can  be  pro-
duced  at  zero,  or  even  negative,  marginal  costs.
The  purpose  of this  appendix  is  to elaborate  on
this  point  and  reason  why  that  may  not  be  the
case  in the  real world.
Assume  that  all markets  are perfectly  competi-
tive  and  there  are  no  externalities.  Under  these
assumptions,  the  short-run  industry  supply  curve
would  be  given  by  horizontal  summation  of that
part  of marginal cost  curves of all  the  firms in the
industry lying above average variable  cost curves.
In  figure  2a,  if  the  industry  supply  curve  S
intersects  the quantity axis at L, then L also would
be  the minimum point on the industry  AVC  curve.
Given  that AVC  curve  is  "U-shaped",  then  to the
left  of  point  L,  MC  curve  must  lie  below  AVC
curve  and  hence,  theoretically,  must  be  negative
for certain  level (s)  of output.  But in the  real world
it  is  almost  impossible  to  support  or  verify  the
existence  of this sort of cost curves.
In  the  real  world,  one would  expect  the  mini-
mum  point  on  the  industry  AVC  to  lie  above  L,
say  at M.  If marginal  cost curve  is  given  by KMS,
then  MS  would  be  the  industry  supply  curve  in
the  short-run.  This  supply  curve  is  reproduced
in  figure  2b.  For  any  price  less  than  OT,  no pro-
duction  would  be  forthcoming  and factor employ-
ment  in  the  industry  would  be  zero.  Obviously,
then  any measure  of rent  that includes  area along
the  LM  segment of the supply curve,  overestimates
the  "true"  rent.  In  this  case,  precise  estimate  of
the  rent  would  be  given  by  the  area  PTMN.  An
implication  of  the  above  specification  is  that  an
accurate  estimate  of rent  and  factor  owners'  wel-
fare  is  extremely  difficult  without  some  know-
ledge  of costs of production.
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Fig.  2a.  Short  run  supply  curve  which  intersects
quantity-axis  and  its  relationship  to AVC
and  MC  curves.
$
0
Fig.  2b.  Relevant  segment  of  short  run  supply
curve and  specification  of economic  rent.
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